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Summary - This paper proposes that the distinctively human capacity for cumulative, adaptive, open-

ended cultural evolution came about through two temporally-distinct cognitive transitions. First, the origin
of Homo-specific culture over two MYA was made possible by the onset of a finer-grained associative
memory that allowed episodes to be encoded in greater detail. This in turn meant more overlap amongst the
distributed representations of these episodes, such that they could more readily evoke one another through
self-triggered recall (STR). STR enabled representational redescription, the chaining of thoughts and actions,
and the capacity for a stream of thought. Second, fully cognitive modernity following the appearance of
anatomical modernity after 200,000 BP, was made possible by the onset of contextual focus (CF): the ability
to shift between an explicit convergent mode conducive to logic and refinement of ideas, and an implicit
divergent mode conducive to free-association, viewing situations from radically new perspectives, concept
combination, analogical thinking, and insight. This paved the way for an integrated, creative internal
network of understandings, and behavioral modernity. We discuss feasible neural mechanisms for this
two-stage proposal, and outline how STR and CF differ from other proposals. We provide computational
evidence for the proposal obtained with an agent-based model of cultural evolution in which agents invent
ideas for actions and imitate the fittest of their neighbors’ actions. Mean fitness and diversity of actions across
the artificial society increased with STR, and even more so with CF, but CF was only effective if STR was
already in place. CF was most effective following a change in task, which supports its hypothesized role in
escaping mental fixation. The proposal is discussed in the context of transition theory in the life sciences.
Keywords - Behavioral modernity, Cognitive transition, Creativity, Cultural evolution, Dual process,

Origin of culture.

Introduction

Regardless of the extent to which any particular skill such as tool use, language, or mental
state attribution is uniquely human, it would be
difficult to argue that any other species remotely
approaches the human capacity for the cultural
evolution of novelty that is accumulative, adaptive, and open-ended (i.e., with no a priori limit
on potential variation). Here, culture refers to
extrasomatic adaptations—including behavior
and technology—that are socially rather than
sexually transmitted. This paper synthesizes

research from anthropology, psychology, archaeology, and agent-based modeling into a speculative yet coherent account of the cognitive transitions underlying human cultural evolution.
Archaeological evidence refers here to the
‘material correlates’ or ‘precipitates’ of behavior. Its interpretation has a long and complex
philosophical history. While earlier approaches
tended to treat artifacts as indicators of varieties
of ‘progress’, ‘conditional cognitive archaeology’
approaches (sensu Haidle, 2009 and WraggSykes, 2015) seek to reveal the cognitive conditions responsible for artifacts (and other material
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precipitates of behavior). We share this more
contemporary approach to understanding the
‘mind behind the artifact’.
We note that there is to some extent a tradeoff in the literature between theories based on
historical data, and theories that are cognitively
sophisticated. This paper aims to synthesize these
approaches, using archaeological data and anthropological research as the point of departure for a
proposal that is consistent with contemporary psychology. Note also that our theoretical approach is
founded on evolutionary principles, but not those
of the evolutionary psychology approach of Tooby
& Cosmides (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Sell et al.,
2009). We take a contemporary conception of evolution that incorporates sociality, individual behavioral variation, agency, and creativity, as opposed to
viewing individuals as slaves to fitness equations.1
Evolutionary transitions
Evolutionary processes have multiple modes
and tempos (Stanley 1979; Gould 2002), and
often generate unexpected outcomes due to nonlinear interactions between such information
levels as genotype, phenotype, environment,
and even developmental characteristics (Galis &
Metz, 2007). In cognitive evolution, evidence of
significant change might well be ’smeared’ over
time and space for many reasons, including lag
between initial appearance and demic diffusion, ambiguities in the archaeological and fossil
records, and other factors. We suggest that the
theory of evolutionary transitions can provide a
useful framework for understanding the cognitive changes culminating in behavioral modernity (BM).
Transitions are common in biological evolution (Szathmary & Maynard Smith, 1995) and
transition research unpacks fuzzier terms such
‘adaptation due to natural selection’, aiming
“··· to analyze trends of increasing complexity”
(Griesmer, 2000), and explain the origins of new
varieties of information organization. Szathmary
1

The sense in which we view culture as an evolutionary
process is described in detail in Gabora (2013) and
summarized in Smith (2013).

& Maynard-Smith’s account of the eight major
transitions in the history of life remains widely
accepted today (Calcott & Sterelny, 2011), with
other transitions continuing to be identified,
including the evolution of new sexes (Parker,
2004), and new varieties of ant agriculture
(Schultz & Brady, 2008), animal individuality (Godfrey-Smith, 2011), metabolism and
cell structure (DeLong et al., 2010), technology
(Geels, 2000) and hominin socialization (Foley
& Gamble 2009). Research on the dynamics
(e.g., rates and types) of evolutionary transitions
shows that despite their variety they exhibit common features: they are (1) rare, (2) involve new
levels of organization of information, (3) followed
by diversification, and (4) incomplete (Wilson,
2010). Szathmary & Maynard-Smith include
the transition from “primate societies to human
societies ” as part of their “Extended Evolutionary
Synthesis” (Wilson, 2010), but this synthesis was
formulated just prior to the beginnings of explicitly evolutionary approaches to modern cognition.
In this paper we explore two such transitions.
The first, discussed in section 2, is the origin of
a richer, post-Pan, post-Australopithecine culture
as early as 2.2 million years ago (Harmand et al.,
2015). The second, discussed in section 3, is the
explosion of creative culture in the Middle/Upper
Paleolithic. Section 4 summarizes simulations
carried out using an agent-based model aimed at
investigating whether the proposed mechanisms
do in fact enhance the capacity for cultural evolution as proposed.
A first cognitive transition

We begin with the archaeological and
anthropological evidence for a second transition,
followed by our proposed cognitive explanation,
and a comparison to other proposals.
Evidence for a first cognitive transition
The minds of Australopithecus and earliest
Homo have been referred to as episodic because
there is no evidence that their experience deviated
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substantially from the present or very near-time
moment of concrete sensory perceptions. Their
archaeological record of simple stone (and some
bone and antler) implements indicates that they
encoded perceptions of events in memory—an
information-handling capacity that supplies
“timely information to the organism’s decisionmaking systems” (Klein et al., 2002, p. 306)—
but had little voluntary access to memories without external cues, which meant minimal innovation and artifact variation.
This is reflected in the early archaeological
record, beginning with stone tools from Lomekwi
3 West Turkana, Kenya, 3.3 mya (Harmand et
al., 2015), and characterized by opportunism
in highly restricted environments (Braun et al.,
2008). Tools were technologically on par with
those of modern chimpanzees (Byrne, 2005;
Blackwell & d’Errico, 2001; see Read (2008)
and Fuentes (2015) for cognitive considerations
of chimpanzee toolmaking). These tools also lack
evidence of symbolism (d’Errico et al., 2003), and
were transported relatively short distances across
landscapes (Potts, 2012). While nut-cracking and
other simple tool use outside Homo may involve
the sequential chaining of actions, and thus the
sequential chaining of the mental representations
underlying these actions, outside Homo this kind
of processing does not occur with sufficient frequency or diversity to cross the threshold to engage
in abstract thought (see Gabora & Steel, 2017 for
a mathematical model of what is needed for this
threshold to be crossed). Thus, the evidence suggests that the ability of early Homo to voluntarily
shape, modify, or practice skills and actions was at
best negligible, and they could not invent or refine
complex actions, gestures, or vocalizations.
Early Homo evolved into a variety of forms,
including H. erectus, dating between 2.8 - 0.3 million years ago (Villmoare et al., 2015). Multiple
lines of evidence suggest a shift away from biology and towards culture as the primary means of
adaption in this lineage, attended by significant
cultural elaboration. Having expanded out from
Africa as early as 2 mya, Homo constructed tools
involving more production steps and more varied
raw materials (Haidle, 2009), imposed symmetry

29

on tool stone (Lepre et al., 2011), used and controlled fire (Goren-Inbar et al., 2004), ranked
moderately high among predators (Plummer,
2004), crossed stretches of open water up to 20
km (Gibbons 1998), ranged as far north as latitude 52◦ (Parfitt et al., 2010), revisited campsites
possibly for seasons at a time, sometimes built
shelters (Mania & Mania 2005), and transported
tool stone over greater distances than their predecessors (Moutsou, 2014).
It is widely believed that these signs of a culture
richer than that of Pan or Australopithecus c. 1.7
mya reflect a transition in cognitive and/or social
characteristics significantly beyond the small-space,
short-time episodic ‘bubble’ of earlier minds.
While the cranial capacity of Homo erectus
was approximately 1,000 cc—about 25% larger
than that of Homo habilis, at least twice as large
as that of living great apes, and 75% that of modern humans (Aiello, 1996)—brain volume alone
cannot explain these developments, which imply
an important cognitive transition.
Background to proposed cognitive mechanism
underlying first transition
Because the cognition of Homo habilis was
primarily restricted to the “here and now” of the
present moment, Donald (1991) refers to it as an
episodic mode of cognitive functioning. He proposed that with the enlarged cranial capacity of
later early Homo, the hominin mind underwent
a transition to a new mode of cognitive functioning made possible by the onset of what he calls
a self-triggered recall and rehearsal loop, which
we abbreviate STR. STR enabled hominins to
voluntarily retrieve stored memories independent
of environmental cues (sometimes referred to as
‘autocuing’) and engage in RR (representational
redescription) and the refinement of thoughts and
ideas. Donald referred to this new kind of mind
as the ‘mimetic mind’ because it could act out or
‘mime’ events that occurred in the past or that
could occur in the future, thereby not only temporarily escaping the present, but through mime
or gesture communicating the escape to others.
STR also enabled attention to be directed
away from the external world toward ones’ internal
www.isita-org.com
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representations, which paved the way for abstract
thought. We use the term abstract thought to
refer to the processing of previously assimilated
experiences, as in occurs counterfactual thinking, planning, or creativity, as opposed to direct
perception of the concrete ‘here and now’ (for a
review of abstract thought, see Barsalou, 2005).
Note that in much of the cultural evolution literature, social learning is contrasted with individual
learning, which involves learning for oneself, and
novelty is attributed to things like copying error
(e.g., Henrich & Boyd, 2002; Mesoudi et al.,
2006; Rogers, 1988). Abstract thought and creativity, if mentioned at all, are equated with individual learning. However, they are not the same
thing. Individual learning deals with obtaining
pre-existing information from the environment
through non-social means (e.g., learning to predict weather patterns by watching the clouds). In
contrast, abstract thought involves mental processing of internally derived contents, and when
this results in the generation of useful or pleasing
ideas, behavior, or artifacts that did not previously
exist, it is said to be creative. Thus, in the case of
individual learning, the information comes from
the external world, while in the case of abstract
thought, it is internally generated. Indeed, there
is increasing recognition of the extent to which
creative outcomes are contingent upon internally
driven incremental/iterative processing (Basadur,
1995; Chan & Schunn, 2015; Feinstein, 2006;
Gabora, 2017).
Note that Donald’s explanation focuses on
neither technical nor social abilities but on a
cognitive trait that could facilitate both. STR
enabled systematic evaluation and improvement
of thoughts and motor acts by adapting them to
new situations, resulting in voluntary rehearsal
and refinement of skills and artifacts. STR also
broadened the scope of social activities to include
pantomime and re-enactive play.
Proposed cognitive mechanism underlying first
transition
Leaving aside alternatives to Donald’s proposal until the end of this section, for now we
note that although Donald’s explanation seems

reasonable so far as it goes, it does not explain
why larger brain size enabled STR. What was
taking place at the at the level of associative
memory that made STR possible? In what follows, we contextualize Donald’s (1991) generally
well received but sketchy theoretical schema in
more current literature. Building on Donald’s
proposal that the cognitive abilities of modern
Homo are due to an accumulation of modes of
representation post-Pan starting with the onset
of STR, we will ground the concept of STR in a
neural level account of the mechanisms underlying cognitive flexibility and creativity (Gabora,
2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013).
We start by summarizing a few well-known
features of associative memory. Each neuron is
sensitive to a primitive stimulus attribute, or
microfeature, such as lines of a particular orientation, or sounds of a particular pitch. Items
in memory are distributed across cell assemblies
of such neurons; thus each neuron participates
in the encoding of many items. Memory is also
content-addressable: there is a systematic relationship between the content of an item and the
neurons that encode it; thus, items that share
microfeatures may be encoded in overlapping
distributions of neurons.
We propose that, while in and of itself
increased brain volume does not explain the
origin of BM, larger brains enabled a transition
from more coarse-grained to more fine-grained
memory. The smaller the number of neurons a
brain has to work with, the fewer attributes of
any given item it can encode, and less able it
is to forge associations on the basis of shared
attributes. Conversely, the evolution of a more
fine-grained memory meant that representations
could be encoded in more detail, i.e., distributed
across larger sets of cell assemblies containing
more neurons. Since the memory organization
was content addressable that meant more ways in
which distributed representations could meaningfully overlap.
Greater overlap enabled more routes by which
one memory could evoke another. This in turn
made possible the onset of STR, and paved the
way for the capacity to engage in recursive recall
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and streams of abstract thought, and a limited
kind of insight (Gabora, 2002, 2010; Gabora
& Ranjan, 2013). To take a simple example, the
reason that the experience of being accidentally
punctured by a thorn could potentially play
a role in the invention of an arrowhead is that
both the thorn wound and hunting experiences
involve overlap in the set of relevant attributes
(i.e., “pointed”, “flesh”, “tear”), and thus overlap
of activated cell assemblies.
Representations could now be reprocessed
until they achieved a form that was acceptably
consistent with existing understandings or sufficiently enabled goals and desires to be achieved
(Gabora, 1998). This scenario provides a plausible neural-level account of Donald’s (1991)
proposal that abstract thought was a natural consequence of possessing a self-triggered recall and
rehearsal loop, which was made possible by the
increase in brain size at this time.
Comparison to other theories
We now compare this theory to prominent
theories concerning the cognitive underpinnings of
the origin of rich, post-Australopithecine culture.
Some theories attribute the origins of rich,
post-Australopithecus culture to social factors.
Foley & Gamble (2009) place the emphasis on
enhanced family bonding and the capacity for
a more focused style of concentration, further
enhanced by controlled use of fire by at least
400,000 years ago. Wiessner (2014) suggests that
fire not only enabled the preparation of healthier
food, but by providing light after dark, facilitated
playful and imaginative social bonding. Others
emphasize an extrication from biologically based
to culturally based kinship networks (Leaf &
Read, 2012; Read, 2012; Read & van der Leeuw,
2015). We believe that these social explanations
are essentially correct, but that they have their
origin in cognitive changes, which altered not
only social interactions but interactions with
other facets of human experience as well.
Our proposal bears some resemblance to
Hauser et al.’s (2002) suggestion that what distinguishes human cognition from that of other
species is the capacity for recursion, Penn et al.’s
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(2008) concept of relational reinterpretation,
and Read’s (2009) claim that relational concepts
and recursive reasoning allowed for a conceptually based system of social relations but may have
evolved in conjunction with non-social activities
such as toolmaking. While our proposal is consistent with this, it goes further, by grounding
the onset of recursive reasoning in a transition in
the structure of associating memory. Read suggests that recursive reasoning was made possible
by larger working memory, while we argue that
larger working memory in and of itself is not useful; it must goes hand-in-hand with (and indeed
is a natural byproduct of ) more fine-grained
memory. As a simple example, let us suppose
that a hominid with a coarse-grained memory
increased its working memory from being able to
think only of one thing at a time (e.g., a thorn) to
two (e.g., a thorn and the sun). This would generally be a source of confusion. However, if it held
only one thing in mind at a time but encoded
it in richer detail (e.g., incorporating attributes
of a thorn such as ‘sharp’, ‘pointy’, ‘thin’, and so
forth), it could forge meaningful associations
with other items based on these attributes (e.g.,
other sharp things or pointy things).
Our proposal also bears some resemblance to
Chomsky’s (2012) concept of ‘merge’. However,
while ‘merge’ is described as the forging of associations between items that are extremely similar, or that co-occur in time or space, STR can
additionally forge associations between items
that are related by as few as a single attribute,
and do so recursively such that the output of one
such operation is the input for the next, and reliably, such that encodings are modified in light
of each other in the course of streams of thought
(Gabora, 2002, 2013, 2017, 2018). (Detailed
examples—including the invention of a fence
made of skis on the basis of the attributes ‘tall’,
‘skinny’ and ‘sturdy’ (Gabora, 2010), and the
generation of the idea of a beanbag chair on the
basis of the single attribute ‘conforms to shape’
(Gabora, 2018)—are provided elsewhere.)
Thus, while merge forges associations based
on overall similarity, for STR the memory must
be sufficiently fine-grained (i.e., items must be
www.isita-org.com
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encoded in enough detail) that the associative
process can operate on the basis of specific attributes to which specific neurons are tuned. Thus
our proposal (but not ‘merge’) offers a causal
link between brain size and cognitive ability,
i.e., more neurons means they can be tuned to a
wider range of attributes and thereby form more
associations on the basis of shared attributes.
Mithen’s (1996) model features the accumulation and overlap of a variety of intelligence
modules. Although in its details his model runs
rather counter to much current thinking including our own, his focus on cognitive fluidity and
creativity influenced the model proposed here.
A second cognitive transition

As with the first transition, we begin with the
archaeological and anthropological evidence for
a second transition, followed by our proposed
cognitive explanation, and finally a comparison
to other proposals.
Evidence for a second transition
The African archaeological record indicates that another significant cultural transition occurred approximately 100,000 years
ago, bearing many of the material correlates of
BM. Though defining BM is somewhat difficult (d’Errico et al., 2005; Shea, 2011), prehistorians generally agree that BM is evidenced
in the archaeological record by a spatially and
temporally quite disparate suite of artifacts and
characteristics including (a) artifacts indicating
personal symbolic ornamentation (d’Errico et
al., 2009), (b) elaborate burial sites indicating
ritual (Hovers et al., 2003) and possibly religion
(Rappaport, 1999), (c) a radical proliferation of
tool types that better fit tools to specific tasks
(McBrearty & Brooks, 2000), (d) ‘cave art’, i.e.,
representational imagery featuring depictions of
animals (Pike et al., 2012) and human beings
(Nelson, 2008), (e) complex hearths and highly
structured use of living spaces (Otte, 2012), (f )
extensive use of bone and antler tools, sometimes
with engraved designs, and (g) calorie-gathering

intensification that included widespread use of
aquatic resources (Erlandson, 2001). BM spread
out of Africa sometime after 100,000 years ago,
and was present in Sub-Himalayan Asia and
Australasia over 50,000 years ago (Mulvaney &
Kamminga, 1999) and Continental Europe not
long thereafter (Mellars, 2006).
Whether this archaeological record reflects
a genuine transition resulting in BM is hotly
debated because claims to this effect are based
on the European Paleolithic record, and largely
exclude the lesser-known African record (Fisher
& Ridley, 2013).
Many artifacts associated with a rapid transition to BM 40,000-50,000 years ago in Europe
are found in the African Middle Stone Age tens
of thousands of years earlier, which pushes the
cultural transition more closely into chronological alignment with the transition to anatomical
modernity between 200,000 and 100,000 BP.
Nevertheless, it is clear that modern behavior
appeared in Africa between 100,000 to 50,000
years ago, and spread, resulting in displacement
of the Neanderthals in Europe (Fisher & Ridley,
2013). Subsequently, the cultures of Homo sapiens
were radically more open-ended and accumulative, meaning that they could archive effectively
infinite amounts of information to be used in
adaptation, one of the adaptive advantages of
complex culture. Despite a lack of overall increase
in cranial capacity, the prefrontal cortex, and more
particularly the orbito-frontal region, increased
significantly in size (Dunbar, 1993), in what was
most likely a time of major neural reorganization
(Morgan 2013).
Proposed cognitive mechanism underlying second
transition
Given that behaviorally modern humans were
demonstrably more creative than any prior hominin (Mithen, 1998), what role could changes at
the cognitive level have played in their evolution?
We propose that the cultural explosion of
the Middle/Upper Paleolithic came about due
to fine-tuning of the biochemical mechanisms
underlying the capacity to spontaneously shift
between different modes of thought depending
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on the situation by varying the specificity of the
activated memory region. The ability to shift
between different modes is referred to as contextual focus (CF) because it requires the capacity to focus or defocus attention in response to
contextual factors (Gabora, 2003), such as the
audience, or level of danger, or goals, which may
shift minute by minute if goals are broken into
subgoals. Focused attention is conducive to analytical thought (Agnoli et al., 2015; Vartanian,
2009; Zabelina, 2018). In analytic thought, the
activation of memory is constrained enough to
hone in and mentally operate on only the relevant aspects of the contents of thought. In
contrast, by diffusely activating a wide region
of memory, defocused attention is conducive to
associative thought; it enables more obscure (but
potentially relevant) aspects of the situation to
come into play. This greatly enhances the potential for insight, i.e., the forging of obscure but
useful or relevant connections.
Once the products of one mode of thought
could become ‘ingredients’ for the other, they
could reflect on the contents of their mind not just
from different perspectives but at different levels of
granularity, from basic level concepts (e.g., deer)
up to abstract concepts (e.g., animal) and down to
more detailed levels (e.g., legs), as well as conceive
of their interrelationships. All this was necessary
in order to have a need to come up with names
for these things, i.e., develop complex languages.
Thus, it is proposed that CF paved the way for not
just language but a range of cognitive abilities considered by anthropologists to be diagnostic of BM.
Note that associative thought is useful for breaking
out of a rut, but would be risky without the ability to reign it back in; basic survival related tasks
may be impeded if everything is reminding you of
everything else. Therefore, it seems reasonable that
it would take considerable time to fine-tune the
mechanisms underlying the capacity to spontaneously shift between these two processing modes
such that one retained the benefits of escaping
local minima without running the risk of being
perpetually side-tracked. The time needed to finetune this could potentially be the explanation for
the lag between anatomical and BM.
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Comparison to other theories
We now review some prevailing hypotheses
for how and why BM and its underlying intellectual capacities arose.
Our proposal is superficially similar to the
idea that what distinguishes human cognition
from that of other species is our capacity for
dual processing (Evans, 2008; Nosek, 2007).
Dual processing posits that humans engage in
not just a primitive implicit Type 1 mode for
free association and fast “gut responses”, but also
an explicit Type 2 mode for deliberate analysis.
However, while dual processing makes the split
between older, more automatic processes and
newer, more deliberate processes, CF makes the
split between an older associative mode based on
relationships of correlation and a newer analytic
mode based on relationships of causation. We
propose that although earlier hominids relied
on the older association-based system, because
their memories were coarser-grained, there were
fewer routes for meaningful associations, so there
was less associative processing of previous experiences. Therefore, items encoded in memory
tended to remain in the same form as when they
were originally assimilated; rather than engaging
in associative or analytic processing of previously
assimilated material, there was greater tendency
to focus on the here and now.
Thus, while dual processing theory attributes
abstract, hypothetical thinking to the more recent
Type 2 mode, according to the CF hypothesis it
is possible in either mode but differs in character
in the two modes (logically constructed arguments in the analytic mode versus flights of fancy
in the associative mode). The CF hypothesis is
rooted in a distinction in the creativity literature
between (1) associative (divergent) processes said
to predominate during idea generation, and (2)
analytic convergent processes said to predominate during the refinement, implementation,
and testing of an idea (Finke et al., 1992). (See
Sowden et al., (2014), for a comparison and discussion of the relationship dual processing theory and dual theories of creativity; see Gabora,
2018 for discussion of the distinction between
associative versus divergent thought).
www.isita-org.com
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To see how the onset of CF could give rise to
open-ended cultural complexity, recall the previously-mentioned properties of associative memory: distributed representation, coarse coding,
and content addressability. Each thought may
activate more or fewer cell assemblies depending
on the nature of the task at hand. Focused attention is conducive to analytic thought because
memory activation is constrained enough to zero
in and operate on the most defining properties.
Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a
diversity of memory locations, is conducive to
associative thought; obscure (but potentially relevant) properties of the situation come into play
(Gabora, 2000, 2010). Thus, while in an analytic
mode of thought the concept TOOL might only
activate ‘hand axe’, in an associative mode of
thought, all sorts of items in ones’ environment
might potentially be used as a tool depending on
what one wants to accomplish. Once it was possible to shift between these modes of thought, cognitive processes requiring either analytic thought,
associative thought or both could be carried out
more effectively, and the fruits of one mode of
thought could become ingredients for the other
mode, thereby facilitating the forging of a richly
integrated creative internal network of understandings about the world and one’s place in it,
which we refer to as a worldview2. This in turn set
in motion behavioral modernity. Thus, the notion
that diffuse activation is conducive to associative
thought while activation of a narrow receptive
field is conducive to analytic thought is consistent with the architecture of associative memory,
and suggests a means by which CF made possible
the capacity to stay on task, yet, when needed,
forge unusual yet relevant connections. Language
enhanced not just the ability to communicate
and collaborate (thereby accelerating the pace of
cultural innovation), but also the ability to think
ideas through for oneself and manipulate them in
a controlled, deliberate manner.
In short, we propose that the emergence
of a self-organizing worldview required two
2

Our concept of worldview is closely aligned with what
Read (2013) refers to as a ’cultural idea system’.

transitions, as illustrated schematically in Figure
1. The onset of STR over 2 mya (as discussed
above) allowed rehearsal and refinement of skills
and made possible minor modifications of representations. The onset of CF approximately
100,000 years ago made it possible to forge larger
bridges through conceptual space that paved the
way for innovations specifically tailored to selective pressures. It enabled a cultural version of
what Gould & Vrba (1982) termed exaptation,
the phenomenon wherein an existing trait is coopted for a new function (Gabora et al., 2013).
Exaptation of representations and ideas dramatically enhanced the ability to, not just cope with
the technological and social spheres of life, but
develop individualized perspectives and unique
worldviews conducive to fulfilling complementary social roles. This increase in cognitive variation provided the raw material for better adaptive fit to selective pressures.
Mithen (1996) proposed that the integration
of previously-compartmentalized intelligence
modules–specialized for natural history, technology, socialization and language–lay at the heart of
BM. That integration is said to have enabled cognitive fluidity: the capacity to combine concepts
and adapt ideas to new contexts, and thereby
explore, map, and transform conceptual spaces
across different knowledge systems. Fauconnier
& Turner (2002) emphasize the benefit of cognitive fluidity for the capacity to draw and understand analogies. Our proposal is consistent with
these explanations, but goes beyond them by
showing how conceptual fluidity arises naturally
as a function of the capacity to, when needed,
shift to a more associative mode of processing.
There are many variants of the theory BM
reflects onset of sophisticated language abilities. Corballis (2011) suggests that this may
have entailed a transition from a predominantly
gestural to a vocal form of communication.
Although the ambiguity of the archaeological evidence makes it difficult to know exactly
when language began (Davidson & Noble 1989;
Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Hauser et al.,
2002), it is widely believed—based on stone tool
symmetry and complexity of manufacture—that
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Fig. 1 - Schematic illustration of the proposed cognitive transitions resulting in behavioral modernity. Over time cognitive features undergo transitions from earlier to later states; different features
are involved in transitions 1 and 2, which are separated by over a million years, with cognition
evolving in a mosaic fashion.
www.isita-org.com
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as long ago as c. 1.7 million years Homo used gestural and prelinguistic vocalization communications that would have shared some organizational
similarities with modern humans insofar as they
differed significantly from other primate communications”. The evolution of grammaticallyand syntactically-modern language is generally
placed (depending on whether one is observing it in Africa, sub-Himalayan Asia or Western
Eurasia) after about 100,000 years ago, around
the start of the Upper Palaeolithic (Bickerton,
2014; Dunbar, 1993; Tomasello, 1999).
Bickerton (2014) proposes that BM entailed
a series of stages (sensu Szathmary, 2015), though
he focuses more specifically on language. In his
view, open-ended cultural evolution began with
selection for brain mechanisms underlying cognitive reorganization, ‘offline thinking’, and the
elaboration and ‘ratcheting’ (cf. Tomasello et al.,
1993) of cultural information. Deacon (1997)
emphasizes onset of the capacity to internally
represent complex, abstract, internally coherent
systems of meaning using symbols. CarstairsMcCarthy (1999) suggests that some form of
syntax was present in the earliest languages, but
most of the later elaboration, including recursive
embedding of syntactic structure, evolved with
BM. It is widely accepted that syntax constituted
a crucial step toward BM, as it made it possible
to state more precisely how elements are related,
and embed them in other elements (Bickerton
& Szathmáry, 2009). Thus, syntax enabled language to become general-purpose and applied in
a variety of situations, highly unlike the situationspecific communication that has been observed
in other species such as velvet monkeys. Donald
(1991) proposed a transition in the mode of representation, enabling the capacity for narrative
myth, as the underwrite of BM. Once again, our
proposal is consistent with the idea that complex language abilities lie at the heart of BM, but
because STR followed by CF would have enabled hominids to not just recursively refine and
modify thoughts but consider them from different perspectives at different hierarchical levels, it
would have stage the stage for complex language
and facilitated the weaving of experiences into

stories, parables, and broader conceptual frameworks, thereby integrating knowledge and experience (see also, Gabora & Aerts, 2009).
Another proposal is that recursion, featuring “the [cognitive] creation of sequences or
[thought] structures of unbound length or complexity” enabled mental time travel, distinctlyhuman cognition, and BM (Corballis, 2011, pp.
5-6; see also Suddendorf et al., 2009). Proponents
note the limited use of recursion in Pan, for
instance, but its centrality in modern human
cognition. Corballis suggests that recursion
allowed for self-actuated recall of past episodes
(analogous to Donald’s ‘autocuing’) and cognitive models of possible futures, resulting in not
just deeper individual bonding and information
sharing but also “deeper levels of Machiavellian
intrigue” (Corballis, 2011, p. 222). For reasons
outlined earlier, we believe that recursive reasoning came about well before BM, though the ability to shift between different modes of thought
using CF would have brought on the capacity to
make vastly better use of it.
Another proposal is that BM arose due to
onset of the capacity to model the contents of
other minds, sometimes referred to as ‘Theory
of Mind’ (Tomasello, 2014). Tomasello further
proposes that this resulted in “shared intentionality”, involving exchange of knowledge and goals,
and potentially accentuation of group concerns
over those of the individual, paving the way for
social selection favoring cohesive groups.
This explanation for BM is somewhat
underwritten by recursion—in other words, the
mechanism that allows for recursion is required
for modeling the contents of other minds—but
the emphasis is on the social impact of recursion, rather than the capacity for recursion itself.
Other social-ecological theories emphasize different factors. Whiten (2011) emphasizes a gradual increase in the complexity of social learning
processes leading to the generation and ratcheting of richer, more diverse cultural traditions and
extrasomatic culture. Foley and Gamble (2009)
examined the ‘ecology of [hominin] social
transitions’; it is in their fifth transition (after
200,000 BP) that BM ‘appears’. Our proposal is
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consistent with explanations that stress the onset
of social abilities, but places these explanations in
a broader framework by suggesting a mechanism
that aided not just social skills but other skills
(e.g., technological) as well.
While most of these explanations are correct insofar as they go, we suggest that none of
them go sufficiently to the root of the matter.
As Carl Woese wrote of science at large “...sometimes [there is] no single best representation...
only deeper understanding, more revealing and
enveloping representations,” (Woese, 2004,
p. 173). We propose that the second cognitive
transition necessary for cumulative, adaptive,
open-ended cultural evolution was the onset of
CF, because once hominids could adapt their
mode of thought to the situation they were in,
and sculpt the output of such thought processes
by subjecting them to different perspectives, and
different levels of analysis, their initially fragmented mental models of their world could be
woven into more coherent mental models of
their world—i.e., worldviews— which facilitated
not just conceptual fluidity, creative problemsolving, and survival, skills but also interactive
social exchange and more complex social structures. We add that the explanation proposed here
is the only one we are aware of that grew out of
a synthesis of archaeological and anthropological
data with theories and research from both psychology and neuroscience. In addition, it is supported by computational simulations, to which
we turn next.

obtained using an agent-based model of cultural
evolution referred to as “EVOlution of Culture”,
abbreviated EVOC. EVOC uses neural network
based agents that (1) invent new ideas, (2) imitate actions implemented by neighbors, (3) evaluate ideas, and (4) implement successful ideas as
actions. EVOC is an elaboration of Meme and
Variations, or MAV (Gabora, 1995), the earliest
computer program to our knowledge to model
not just cultural transmission but cumulative,
adaptive, cultural evolution. The goal behind
EVOC (and MAV) was to distill the underlying
logic of cultural evolution. As such, it is a vastly
simplified model, much simpler than models of
language evolution (e.g., Steels, 2012). Agents
do not evolve in a biological sense—they neither die nor have offspring—but do in a cultural
sense, by cumulatively modifying each others’
ideas for actions. Results obtained with this
model may or may not tell us something about
what is going on in the real world, but it allows
us to vary one parameter while holding others
constant and thereby test otherwise untestable
hypotheses. This approach is particularly useful
for studies at the interface between anthropology
and psychology due to the sparseness of the premodern archaeological record. Although methods for analyzing these remains are becoming
increasingly sophisticated, they cannot always
distinguish amongst competing theories. Thus,
computational models can be particularly valuable, providing a means of assessing the feasibility
of theories concerning the origins of behaviorally
modern cognition.

Simulation of two cultural
transitions

The computational model
We summarize the architecture of EVOC in
sufficient detail to explain our results; for details
see (e.g., Leijnen & Gabora, 2009).
Agents. Agents consist of (1) an auto associative
neural network, which encodes ideas for actions
and detects trends in what constitutes a fit action,
(2) a ‘perceptual system’, which carries out the
evaluation and imitation of neighbors’ actions,
and (3) a body, consisting of six body parts which
implement actions. The neural network is composed of six input nodes and six corresponding

We have reviewed the evidence for two
hypotheses: (1) the earliest signs of culture were
due to the onset of STR, which enabled representational redescription and abstract thought,
and (2) the cultural explosion of the MiddleUpper Paleolithic was due to the onset of CF.
We now summarize support for the hypothesis
that these abilities played vital roles in the arrival
of behavioural modernity and cultural evolution
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Tab. 1 - Definitions and examples of terms.

TERM

DEFINITION

EXAMPLE

Body Part

Component of agent other than neural network.

Left Arm (LA)

Sub-action

Set of six components that indicates position of 6 body ( {HD:0, LA:1, RA:-1, LL:1,
parts. Each can be in a neutral (0), up (1), or down -1) RL:0, HP:-1; This sub-action
position.
is abbreviated 01-110-1}

Action

One or more sequential sub-actions.

{{01001-1}, {-10-1-111}}

Template

Abstract or prototypical format for a sub-action.
Position of a body part can be unspecified (*).

{HD:0, LA:*, RA:1, LL:*,
RL:1, HP:-1}

output nodes that represent concepts of body
parts (LEFT ARM, RIGHT ARM, LEFT LEG,
RIGHT LEG, HEAD, and HIPS), as well as hidden nodes that represent more abstract concepts
(LEFT, RIGHT, ARM, LEG, SYMMETRY,
OPPOSITE, and MOVEMENT). Input nodes
and output nodes are connected to hidden nodes
of which they are instances (e.g., LEFT ARM
is connected to LEFT.) Activation of any input
node activates the MOVEMENT node. Samedirection activation of symmetrical input nodes
(e.g., upward motion–of both arms) activates the
SYMMETRY node. Further details concerning
the neural network are provided in Appendix A.
Invention. An idea for a new action is a pattern consisting of six elements that dictate the
placement of the six body parts. Agents generate new actions by modifying their initial action
or an action that has been invented previously
or acquired through imitation. During invention, the pattern of activation on the output
nodes is fed back to the input nodes, and invention is biased according to the activations of
the SYMMETRY and MOVEMENT hidden
nodes. (Were this not the case there would be
no benefit to using a neural network.) To invent
a new idea, for each node of the idea currently
represented on the input layer of the neural network, the agent makes a probabilistic decision
as to whether the position of that body part will
change, and if it does, the direction of change
is stochastically biased according to the learning rate. If the new idea has a higher fitness

than the currently implemented idea, the agent
learns and implements the action specified by
that idea.
Imitation. The process of finding a neighbor
to imitate works through a form of lazy (nongreedy) search. The imitating agent randomly
scans its neighbors, and adopts the first action
that is fitter than the action it is currently implementing. If it does not find a neighbor that
is executing a fitter action than its own current action, it continues to execute the current
action.
Evaluation: The fitness function. Fitness was
evaluated using an adaptation of the Royal Roads
fitness function (Forrest & Mitchell, 1993).
Definitions of terms used in the evaluation of the
fitness of an action are provided in Table 1. The
first fitness function is determined by 45 templates. The second fitness function is constructed
analogously but with different sub-actions. The
templates can be thought of as defining the cultural significance of types of sub-actions (such as
dance steps).
Each template Ti consists of six components,
one for each body part (i.e.,Tij = ti; j = 1..6).
Each body part can be in a neutral position
(0), up (1), down (-1), or an unspecified position (*). Six examples of templates are provided
in Table 2. For example, in template Ti = *, 1,
−1, *, *, 0, the left arm is up (LA:1), the right
arm is down (RA:-1), the hips are in the neutral
position (HP:0), and the positions of other body
parts is unspecified (HD:*, LL:*, and RL:*). The
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templates provide constraints, as well as flexibility with respect to what constitutes a fit action.
For example, in an optimally fit action, the head
must be in the neutral position (in T1 the first
component is 0) but the positions of other body
parts can vary).
Details of the calculation of the fitness of
an action are provided in appendix B. The fitness functions are difficult to solve because they
are rugged, consisting of many peaks and valleys; hill-climbing is not guaranteed to lead to
an optimal solution. There are multiple fitness
peaks, that must be crossed before reaching the
plateau. For example, consider the fitness function given in Table 2. The action 0,0,0,0,0,0 has
a fitness of 6. An agent may move on from this
action to find an actions that fits the third order
templates with a fitness of 31, e.g., F (D) : {1, 1,
1, 1, 1, 0} = 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 3
+ 1 = 31. Midway through a run (at iteration 50)
the fitness function changes to test the ability to
adapt to a sudden change in task constraints or
environment.
Learning. Invention makes use of the ability to
learn trends and respond adaptively to them.
Knowledge acquired through the evaluation of
actions is translated into educated guesses about
how to invent fit actions. For example, an agent
may learn that symmetrical movement tends to
be either beneficial or detrimental, and bias the
generation of new actions accordingly.
A Typical Run. Fitness and diversity of actions
are initially low because all agents are initially
immobile, implementing the same action, with
all body parts in the neutral position. Soon some
agent invents an action that has a higher fitness
than immobility, and this action gets imitated,
so fitness increases. Fitness increases further as
other ideas get invented, assessed, implemented
as actions, and spread through imitation. The
diversity of actions increases due to the proliferation of new ideas, and then decreases as agents
hone in on the fittest actions. Thus, over successive rounds of invention and imitation, the
agents’ actions improve. EVOC thereby models how “descent with modification” occurs in a
purely cultural context.
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Tab. 2 - A partial set of the templates used in the
first fitness function.

T1 = {0, *, *, *, *, *}

T24 = {1, *, *, 1, 1, *}

T2 = {*, 0, *, *, *, *}

T25 = {1, *, 1, *, 1, *}

T3 = {*, *, 0, *, *, *}

T26 = {1, *, 1, 1, *, *}

Method
Modeling Chaining (First Transition). EVOC
has been used to simulate a simple form of STR:
the capacity to join representations together
sequentially, which we refer to as chaining (so
as not to convey the impression that it is a fullfledged model of the many ways in which STR
could occur).
Since our immediate goal was to investigate
the impact of chaining (as opposed to faithfully rendering its underlying mechanisms in
humans), in these simulations the capacity for
chaining was simply turned on or off as opposed
to coming about through the evolution of finer
grained memory. Chaining gives agents the
opportunity to execute multi-step actions. The
agent can keep adding a new sub-action to its
current action so long as the most recently-added
sub-action is both novel and successful. A subaction D is considered novel if at least one of its
components is different from that of the previous sub-action. It is considered successful if there
exists a template Ti such that Φ(Ti, D) is one, as
per equation 1.
Successful (D) =

{

true if \T i : Φ(T i, D) = 1
false otherwise

(1)

The fitness of an action consisting of more
than one sub-action is obtained by adding the
number of sub-actions to the fitness of the last
sub-action in the sequence. For example, if the
last sub-action of an action is D = [0, 1, −1, 1,
−1, 1] and the number of sub-actions is seven,
the fitness of the action is F (D) + 7 = 14 + 7
= 21. Thus where c is ‘with chaining’, w is
www.isita-org.com
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Fig. 2 - Schematic illustration of the algorithm without chaining or CF, with chaining only, and with both.

L. Gabora & C.M. Smith

‘without chaining’, n is the number of chained
sub-actions, the fitness of a chained action, Fc, is
calculated as per equation 2.
Fc = Fw + n

(2)

An agent can execute an arbitrarily long
action so long as it continues to invent successful new sub-actions. In general, the more subactions the fitter the action.
Chaining is admittedly a simple form of RR,
but the goal here was simply to test hypotheses
about how the capacity for this kind of (by some
definitions) recursive process operating at the individual level affects the dynamics at the societal level.
Modeling Contextual Focus (Second Transition).
Mathematical models both chaining of CF, and
their impact on the global structure of the conceptual idea network or worldview, have been developed (Gabora & Aerts, 2009; Gabora & Steel,
2017), and the model of CF was consistent with
experimental data from a study in which participants were asked to rate the typicality of exemplars
of a concept for different contexts (Veloz et al.,
2011). CF was also incorporated into a portrait
painting computer program generated artworks
that humans preferred over those generated without CF (DiPaola & Gabora, 2009). However, the
portrait painting program did not allow investigation of the effect of CF on the evolution of ideas
through cultural interaction. Therefore, CF was
also modeled using EVOC. In the convergent
mode, the current action is only slightly modified
to create a new action. In the divergent mode, the
current action is substantially modified to create
a new action. An agent switches between these
modes by modifying its rate of creative change
(RCC). If the fitness of its current action is low
relative to previous actions, RCC increases, causing the agent to shift to a more divergent processing mode conducive to large leaps through
the space of possibilities. If action fitness is high
relative to that of previous actions, RCC decreases,
and the agent shifts to a more convergent mode
conducive to minor adjustments. With CF turned
off, RCC stays constant throughout the run at 1/6
(i.e., a new action involves change to one of the
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six body parts). The equation to modify RCC is
shown in Equation 3.
∆RCC = −a(Fnew − Fold)

(3)

Since at the start of a run previous fitness is
undefined, RCC in this case is a function of the
current fitness as per Equation 4, where 0 < b < 1.
RCCinitial = bFcurrent

(4)

In the results shown here, a and b were
initialized to -0.005 and 0.8 respectively. The
implementation of neither chaining nor CF,
chaining alone, CF alone, and both chaining and
CF simultaneously, are schematically illustrated
in panels a, b, c, and d, respectively of Figure 2.
Results and Discussion

The results of incorporating chaining and
CF into the method by which agents generated
cultural novelty are summarized in Table 3. The
results of introducing chaining and CF on the
mean fitness and diversity (total number of different actions) of actions across all agents in the
society are shown in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
Chaining and CF both significantly increased
the mean fitness of actions. Without chaining, mean fitness quickly reached a plateau;
with chaining, the space of possibilities became
open-ended, and thus the fitness of cultural outputs could increase indefinitely. This is consistent with the hypothesis that chaining enabled
the ratcheting of outputs necessary for cultural
change to become an evolutionary process.
Inspection revealed that although there is always
convergence on optimal actions, without chained
actions this set was static because the space of possibilities was finite, thus mean fitness plateaued.
On the other hand, with chained actions the
space of possibilities was not finite, and the set of
optimal actions changed slowly but continuously
as increasingly fit actions continued to be found.
www.isita-org.com
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Fig. 3 - Mean fitness of cultural outputs across the society with both chaining and CF (red line),
chaining only (dashed blue line), and neither chaining nor CF (dotted green line). Data are means of
500 runs. To test the ability to respond to change in the task or environment, there was a change of
fitness function at iteration 50. While chaining and CF were both beneficial, the capacity for major
changes using CF was ultimately of little value without the ability to make minor refinements using
chaining. The fact that CF was only beneficial following exposure to a new fitness function is consistent with its hypothesized role in facilitating new ways of thinking.

CF made a contribution to fitness above that
of chaining alone. While chaining increased mean
fitness throughout the run, CF was most effective
following initial exposure to a new fitness function, i.e., at the beginning of the run or at iteration 50 when the fitness function changed. This
supports CF’s hypothesized role in responding to
radical change. When agents were first exposed to
a fitness function, CF increased both the rate at
which new possibilities were generated and the
rate of convergence on the fittest of these.
Both chaining and CF also significantly
increased the diversity, or number of different

actions, as shown in Figure 4. Chaining exaggerated both the initial increase in diversity as the
space of possibilities was explored, and the subsequent decrease in diversity as agents converged
on the fittest actions. As with fitness, CF alone
exerted no noticeable effect on diversity once
agents had fit actions. However, if chaining was
already in place, CF made the inverted-U shaped
pattern even more pronounced. The fact that CF
had a negligible effect on fitness and diversity
of actions unless chaining was already in place
is consistent with the hypothesis that chaining
arose first and CF arose second.
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Tab. 3 - Summary of agent-based model results.

DV

NO CHAINING, NO CF

CHAINING ONLY

CF ONLY

CHAINING + CF

Fitness of
Actions

Reached plateau

Increased indefinitely
(open-ended)

Reached plateau

Increased indefinitely
(open-ended)

Diversity of
Actions

Increased then converged
on fittest

Explosive increase,
faster convergence

Increased then
converged on fittest

More explosive increase,
even faster convergence

Set of Optimal
Actions

Static

Constantly fluctuates Static
as fitter actions found

General Discussion

We have outlined a speculative but coherent, multilevel explanation for how the uniquely
human capacity for collectively generated,
open-ended, adaptive cultural evolution could
have come about. Although change occurred
in a mosaic fashion in the Homo lineage over a
period spanning more than two million years,
the resulting overall pattern may be discerned as
comprising two significant evolutionary transitions. First, the larger brain of H. erectus resulted
in finer grained memory with detailed representations, paving the way for rehearsal of actions,
refinement of skills, novel associations between
closely related items in memory. This enabled
STR, escape from episodic proximity, representational redescription (RR), minor improvements
in cultural outputs, and a “cultural ratcheting”
that expanded the capacity for open-ended cultural evolution. Much later, around 100,000
BP, newly-evolved basal ganglia circuits enabled
onset of contextual focus: the ability to shift
between convergent and divergent modes of
thought, enabling hominins to process information from different perspectives and at multiple
levels of detail. Hominins could now put their
own spin on the ideas of others, adapting them
to individual needs and tastes, leading to cumulative innovation.
Thoughts, impressions, and attitudes could
be modified by thinking about them in the context of each other, and they could be woven into
an integrated “worldview” that defines who we
are in relation to the world. This allowed the

Constantly fluctuates as
fitter actions found

capacity for self expression, creating an environment conducive to the emergence of complex
language, including grammar, recursion, word
inflections, and syntactical structure, as well as
comprehension. The proposal is consistent with
findings that FOXP2 is associated with cognitive abilities that do not involve language, and
with findings that non-language creative abilities arose at approximately the same time as
complex language (Chrusch & Gabora, 2014).
It is also consistent with findings that despite
the existence of sophisticated cognitive abilities
in other species such as birds (Emery, 2016),
we alone exhibit cumulative cultural evolution.
Cumulative cultural evolution may involve the
‘recycling’ of cortical maps such that cultural
innovations invade evolutionarily older brain
circuits and inherit some of their structural constraints (Dehaene, 2005; Lierberman, 2016). In
short, we propose that the distinctive rich symbolism and grammatically complex language of
the genus Homo reflect two evolutionary transitions brought about by novel forms of cognitive
information processing.
Many evolutionary approaches to the general question of how modern cognition arose
have been devised in the last few decades, such
as those of Wynn & Coolidge (e.g., Wynn et al.,
2017) highlighting developmental psychology)
and Bruner (e.g. 2010), highlighting palaeoneurology; we submit our approach as one of this
array of modern evolutionary approaches to the
same broad issue of the origins of BM.
We presented archaeological evidence for the
view that two cognitive transitions gave rise to
www.isita-org.com
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two cultural transitions, as well as support for
the proposed scenario obtained using an agentbased model of cultural evolution. Although
such a model cannot provide proof it can play an
important role in building a case by demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed mechanisms.
Incorporating one kind of STR—chaining—
into the computational model increased the fitness and diversity of cultural outputs, as well as
the effectiveness of learning. The simulations,
including the implementation of both chaining
and CF, were simplistic; nevertheless the results
suggest that once hominins became able to
sequence thoughts together to generate increasingly complex and refined cultural outputs, and
shift between different processing modes, they
would have had a significant adaptive advantage.
In future investigations we will use a sophisticated mathematical theory of concepts (Aerts et
al., 2013) to develop a richer and more realistic
model of cultural evolution. This will allow us to
expand the simulation of STR to include not just
chaining but also refinement of representations
by viewing them from different contexts, and
expand the simulation of the divergent mode of
CF to incorporate the generation of new concept
combinations.
We note that models of the origins of culture and BM have long suffered from vagueness.
For example, Donald (1991) and Mithen (1996)
both propose that hominin cognitive evolution
arose in stages, but are vague as to how and why
these stages unfolded. The transitions to possession of the cognitive capacities that we propose
made BM possible—STR and CF—exhibit the
defining characteristics of evolutionary transitions discussed in Section One, i.e., such transitions are rare, incomplete (did not ‘throw a
switch’ resulting in immediate ‘turning on’ of
BM), and involved new levels of organization.
The increased sociality implied by the onset of
STR and CF also meets Wilson’s expectation that
evolutionary transitions drive “. . . the suppression of fitness differences within groups, causing
between-group selection to become the primary
evolutionary force” (Wilson, 2010). It is interesting that EVOC results support Griesmer’s (2000)

hypothesis that a stage involving novel information complexity precedes stabilization mechanisms that ‘fix’ fit innovations as illustrated by
the initial increase and subsequent decrease in
cultural diversity.
It may well be that early models of the origins of hominin culture were accurate, but not
precise, and that present-day precision reflects
an emerging ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’
(Smith & Ruppell, 2011; Woese, 2004). The
origins of BM are currently being rethought in
light of wide dissatisfaction with an archaic ‘traitlist’ approach to its understanding (Ames et al.,
2013) and with new, nonlinear models of multifaceted cultural evolutionary change (Mesoudi,
2009; McDowell, 2013). We propose that the
origins of BM can be considered in terms of an
evolutionary transition in which new varieties of
information were generated and handled—both
within the mind and in artificial memory systems external to it—to the degree that new social
arrangements appeared.
Similarly, our theoretical arguments, and results
obtained with EVOC, suggest that once humans
became able to employ an exploratory, divergent
processing mode when stuck, followed by a shift to
a more constrained convergent processing mode to
fine-tune their cultural outputs, they would have
been capable of generating significantly more valuable cultural outputs. A potential pitfall of processing in a divergent mode is that since effort is
devoted to the re-processing of previously learned
material, less effort may be devoted to being on the
lookout for danger and simply carrying out practical tasks. Since divergent thought carries a high
cognitive load, it would not have been useful to
think divergently until there was a means to shift
back to a convergent mode. Although the EVOC
results do not prove that onset of the capacity to
chain thoughts together into sequences, and to
shift between divergent modes of thought through
CF, are responsible for our cultural complexity, it
shows that they provide a computationally feasible explanation. We know of no other cognitive
mechanisms implicated in the evolution of complex culture for which open-ended, adaptive cultural change has been demonstrated.
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Appendix A - Training the Neural Network

The neural network starts with small random
weights between input/output nodes. Weights
between hidden nodes, and weights between
hidden nodes and input/output nodes, are
fixed at +/- 1.0. Patterns that represent ideas for
actions are learned by training for 50 iterations
using the generalized delta rule with a sigmoid
activation function (Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986). Since the network is an auto-associator
training continues until the output matches the
input. The relevant variables are:
aj = activation of j
tj = jth component of input
wij = weight on link from i to j
β = 0.15
θ = 0.5
1
aj =
−β[!wij ai+θ]
(1 + e
)

(5)

(6)

For hidden units the error term is computed
as follows:
δi = aj (1 − aj )! δjwij

19
F (D) = i=1
Φ(T i, D) x Ω(T i)

(8)

As shown in this equation, fitness is a function of template weight (Φ(T i, D)) and template
order (Ω(T i)).
Template Weight

For the movement node, we use the absolute
value of ai (since negative movement is not possible;
the least you can move is to not move at all). The
comparison between input and output involves
computing an error term, which is used to modify
the pattern of connectivity in the network such that
its responses become more correct. For input/output units the error term is computed as follows:
δj= (tj − aj )aj (1 − aj )

j = 1..6). Thus, dj represents the position of the
jth body part and the value of dj can be either
0 (neutral), 1 (up), or -1 (down). Likewise,
the value of tji can be 0, 1, -1, or * (unspecified). Accordingly, the fitness of sub-action D is
obtained as per Eq. 8.

(7)

Φ(T i, D) is a function that determines the
weight of sub-action D by comparing it with
template T i. This weight is set to one if each component of the sub-action (i.e., dj ; j = 1..6) either
matches the corresponding component of the
template (i.e., tji ; j = 1..6) or if the corresponding
components of the template is unspecified (i.e.,
ti = *):
Φ(T i, D) =

{

1 if [tji U T i : tji = dj or *
0 otherwise

Template Order

Ω(T i) computes the order of the template
T by counting the number of components that
have a specified value (i.e., tji /= *).
i

6

Ω(T i) = ! tji
Appendix B - Calculating the fitness of a
template.

Assume that D is a sub-action (i.e., D = dj ;
j = 1..6) and Ti is the ith template (i.e., Ti = tji ;

(9)

j=1,tji !*

(10)

The optimal sub-actions are {0, 1, −1, 1, −1, 1},
{0, 1, −1, 1, −1, −1}, {0, −1, 1, −1, 1, 1}, and
{0, −1, 1, −1, 1, −1}

